Introduction
There is a growing literature on the various impacts of There were a few other developed economies besides the United States in the group of large-deficit countries (namely, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia and Turkey), which had a combined share of 22.6% of deficits, and 75 small, mainly developing countries, which accounted for another 17.1% of deficits.
The main surplus countries were China, Japan, Germany and six other countries, four of which are oil exporters. The other two countries -the Netherlands and Switzerland -are not oil exporters, but they generated 75% of all surpluses before the crisis (Figure 2 ). Like China, but on a smaller scale, many developing countries have built currency reserves that are invested mainly in United States Treasury bonds (Priewe, 2010 ). China's much-discussed surplus accounted for 19.1% of the aggregate surplus, while Japan and Germany together accounted for nearly 25%. There were also 45 small, mainly strongly performing developing countries that accounted for the remaining approximately quarter of total surpluses. (Priewe, 2010) . The other three countries shown in Figure 3 (Russia, Germany and Japan) had current account surpluses over the first several years of the new century.
Among the countries with current account surpluses, the role of the big oil exporters and the European countries is evident, as is the sharply increasing role of China. The United States has the largest current account deficit, although this deficit declined slightly just prior to the crisis. Japan, whose deficit has remained nearly constant, clocks in at number 2, followed by the rest of the world and the European countries, whose deficits have increased, particularly in 2008.
Traditionally, the surplus countries mark higher GDP growth, as in the case of China, Russia, and others, in contrast to the deficit countries, such as the United States (Figure 4) . 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 • The simple average of the GDP growth rate for the years 2008 and 2009. Looking at both years together provides a better picture than looking only at 2009, the year that most of the decline occurred.
• The percent change in the GDP growth rate be- However, beyond these regional features, the impact of the crisis has clearly varied with the state of development of the economies in question. On examining the different categories of countries, the EU-27 countries are divided into 4 groups by GDP per capita (in EUR by PPS -EKS method, which means GDP based on PPP calculated using Elteto-Köves-Szulc's method):
• Low income countries (less than 15,000 EUR): Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
• Lower middle-income countries (between 15,000 and 20,000 EUR): the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Portugal, and Slovakia.
• Upper middle-income countries (between 20,001 and 25,000 EUR): Greece, Cyprus, and Slovenia.
• High income countries (over 25,000 EU): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries represent the so-called old EU-15 without Greece and Portugal and are the core of the Euro area (17).
Dullien uses an approach similar to the one in this study (Dullien, 2010 tween the two variables -current account balance in 2007 and changes in GDP growth is 0.512. Moreover, when the absolute current account balance is used, the correlation coefficient is higher but negative (-0.588).
In general, this means that for a given country or group of countries, lower current account imbalances are associated with a better (positive) crisis experience.
We have further divided the EU-27 into four country groups according to their current-account positions prior to the crisis: (a) Countries with a current account surplus of: -more than 5% of GDP: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Finland.
-less than 5% of GDP: Germany, Luxembourg; Netherlands, and Sweden. A similar tendency is observed for the sample of EU-27 countries ( Figure 9 ). Countries with large curList of the countries: 1. Belgium, 2. Bulgaria, 3. Czech Republic, 4. Denmark, 5 Geramny, 6. Estonia, 7. Ireland, 8. Greece, 9. Spain, 10. France, 11. Italy, 12. Cyprus, 13. Latvia, 14. Lithuania, 15. Luxembourg, 16. Hungary, 17. Malta, 18. Netherlands, 19. Austria, 20. Poland, 21. Portugal, 22. Romania, 23. Slovenia, 24. Slovakia, 25. Finland, 26. Sweden, 27 . United Kingdom. Considering the relationship between the current account position and average inflation of the countries or groups of countries prior to the crisis, we arrive at the following finding: the higher current-account deficits or surpluses, the higher the inflation (Table 3) . Thus, once again, not only do current-account deficits appear to have contributed to the propagation of the crisis but also current-account surpluses. This tendency is more deficit of more than 5% of GDP deficit of less than 5% of GDP surplus of less than 5% of GDP surplus of more than 5% of GDP (Dullien, 2010) . Variables that were insignificant, at least at the 10% level, were eliminated. Where the impact was measured as a change in growth rate, the results indicated that only per capita GDP levels and current-account imbalances had a clearly negative influence on the way a country was affected by the crisis (both coefficients were significant at the 5% level).
In addition, both the current-account balance and the absolute value of the current-account balance were alternatively included to allow for the possibility that large surpluses also make a country vulnerable. 
R square = 0.353
Standard Errors of the Estimate = 5.045
Equations (1) and (1a) lead to the following findings:
• For the sample of 179 countries, those with higher per capita incomes were hit significantly harder by the crisis than those with lower incomes. In the case of the EU-27, those countries with lower GDP per capita were hit harder, but their weight in the EU's average growth rate change is small.
• Interestingly, the current-account balance as percent of GDP was insignificant in explaining the change in GDP growth, whereas the absolute value of the current-account balance as a percent of GDP turned was highly significant (to varying degrees for the two groups of countries). This means that the magnitude of the current-account imbalances (regardless of whether they are surpluses or deficits) is the impor-
ЕU-27 179 countries

Current account surplus of:
More than 5% of GDP 2.08 7.5
Less than 5% of GDP 1.83 3.8
Current account deficit of:
Less than 5% of GDP 2.55 6.6
More than 5% of GDP 4.53 5.9 Table 3 . Average inflation by current account position of countries in 2007, % Note: For EU countries, the author's calculations are based on Eurostat data. For the 179 countries, see (Dullien, 2010) .
Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl With respect to equations (2) and (2a), we arrive at the following findings:
• Countries that ex perienced strong growth prior to the crisis reversed course and entered deep recessions. Among the EU-27 countries, the highest average GDP growth rate prior to the crisis was registered mainly by the low income NMCs (7.46%) that, through the 2000s, followed a persistent policy of catching up to the level of development of the leading countries. They are followed by the middle low-income countries (5.02%), middle high-income countries (4.52%) and high income countries (3.20%), i.e., the main countries in the Euro area. Concerning the 179-country sample, the growth rates across the same groups are as follows: 5.4%; 6.1%; 5.9% and 4.5%.
• For the sample of 179 countries, GDP per capita was a very strong predictor of lower growth during the crisis years. One reason for this may be that the crisis originated in some of the most developed countries. In the case of the EU-27, GDP per capita is a weak predictor in a different way for lower growth in the crisis years.
• The current-account deficit, not its absolute value, seems to be a significant variable for the two samples.
A larger deficit prior to the crisis led to lower growth during the crisis years. The relationship is the opposite for the EU-27 due to the aforementioned negative signs of the average annual growth rates of GDP in 2008 and 2009 for all countries without Poland.
• According to the two regressions, a higher rate of inflation prior to the crisis is correlated with a higher drop in the growth rate during the crisis (even when controlling for GDP growth prior to the crisis).
• but also the larger value of the current account imbalances (whether deficits or surpluses).
In the 179-country regression, inflation prior to the crisis seems to have influenced the impact of the crisis, but not in the way that would be predicted by the standard theory. In the standard model, a higher rate of inflation prior to the crisis was correlated with a higher growth rate during the crisis. In the case of the EU-27, the lower rate of inflation prior to the crisis is correlated with a higher growth rate during the crisis.
The latter finding is in accordance with the prediction of the standard theory. 3. Large current-account imbalances -not only deficits but also surpluses -prior to the crisis are also an important risk factor for the two groups of countries. In the case of the EU-27, absolute current-account imbalances seem to be a more important risk factor for vulnerability to crisis transmission.
4. Inflation, long a prime concern for macroeconomic stability and an important factor in increasing a country's vulnerability to financial and currency crises, does not seem to be as significant a factor as previously believed.
